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Origuchi1 Shinobu2’s Marebitoron in a Global Perspective 








  The concept of marebito3 is arguably the most striking contribution made by the late 
kokugaku ethnologist and theorist of literature Origuchi Shinobu (1872-1953) to the 
history of Japanese philosophy. Notwithstanding, his contribution has been largely 
ignored up to the present by historians, and the only conceivable explanation is that the 
term marebito itself is not a proper concept in the strict philosophical sense, but a kind 
of pseudo-concept, halfway between the abstract conception of a certain reality and the 
imaginary projection of a literary archetype. As a consequence, the concept has been 
appreciated by students of classical Japanese literary history, but ignored by 
philosophers in general, due on the one hand, to the above mentioned dependency on a 
certain imagery of Japanese antiquity and folklore, and on the other, to the perceived 
difficulty of applying it in a general sense to realities beyond the narrow confines of 
Japanese ethnicity. 
I develop my argument in three phases. First, I discus  the notion of marebito 
according to original sources in the collected works of Origuchi. His work on marebito 
extends from its original inception in 1923 to the finishing touches he made in 1952 and 
covers the whole of his academic career. The first decade is crucial in the formation of 
his conception. The first essays especially reveal the primary insights Origuchi draws 
from his own sources. His analysis traces the development of the belief in marebito 
through Japanese history, but there is an original prototype in association with this 
belief. I focus my attention on the early construction of his analysis, as the setting in 
which the marebito may be seen as the “other,” as presented in Western philosophy. So 
I propose the interpretive notion of marebito-as-other. In the second phase, I analyze 
philosophies of the “other” synchronically on a global scale. When we focus on the 
moment the marebitoron was first conceived, we find that 1923 was a period of 
transition, a time when the need to renew cultural energies was equally felt in Europe as 
in Japan, and philosophies of the “other”were being shaped. This permits me to attempt 
a comparative analysis of these philosophies from the perspective of Origuchi’s analysis. 
The sources examined lead to a transcultural and transdisciplinary discussion. In the 
third phase, I set aside the history of the critical literature on the subject, to concentrate 
                                                
1 It is usual to transliterate the name as Orikuchi. Nonetheless, in this essay I follow the spelling used by 
the author’s disciple, the theologian Ueda Kenji (1927-2003). The author wishes to express his gratitude 
to Albert Craig and wife, who suggested many corrections in grammar and style to this essay. 
2 Japanese names are given in the usual Japanese ordr, family name first. 
3 Literally “rare person.” A term found in ancient Japanese literary records for a spirit or god that my 
bisit a village during a festival,  the building ofa house, or other special occasions. Since Origuchi, the 
term and the idea it represents has been appreciated no  only by scholars of Japanese classical literature 
and Japanese antiquity and folklore, but also by theorists of Japanese culture and ethnicity at large. On the 
other hand, it has been largely ignored by internatio l philosophers as too limited in conception andtoo 
thightly entangled in Japanese ethnicity. Origuchi S nobu is an ethnologist and scholar of National 
Studies or kokugaku, who has written of its place in Japanese literary and cultural history. In this paper I 
discuss Origuchi’s analysis and also attempt to relate the concept of marebito to comparable notions in 
20th. Century European history of philosophy. 
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on three recent contributions. Discussing these works from a present-day perspective, I 
would suggest that not only can the marebito be seen as the “other” (marebito-as-other) 
but that the “other” of European philosophy can profitably be interpreted as the 
marebito (other-as-marebito). 
 
  The term marebito first appears in Origuchi’s scholarly writings in Part 2 of his 1923 
“Kokubungaku no hassei” (‘The origin of national literature’). It is a pivotal addition by 
Origuchi to his own personal appreciation of the question of the origin of Japanese 
literature, his “theory on ancient Japan” (kodairon). This gives us a clue to 
understanding the concept, which has been discussed by scholars since the early 
argument by Yanagita Kunio. Though Origuchi originally conceived the marebito in 
terms of his research on ancient Japan, his central concern was the application of his 
notion to the historical present. He wrote: 
 
The word marebito has in fact a deep meaning attached to it. The holy visitor who 
comes to the celebration of the building of the new house was seen as an avatar of 
a kami who came only rarely. Perhaps this visitor, after offering an incantation 
[mantra], was entertained at a banquet. Even today, in the countryside of Okinawa, 
there is the belief that a house is built in the daytime by human labour, but 
continued by kami during the night. On the day the ridge-poles of the roof are 
raised, kami descend into the house and ring bells and beat the pillars. The sound 
is said to be heard by the inhabitants who lie prostrate on the roof. Of course, it is 
produced by the miko. (Vol. 1, 79) 
 
Two sources provide this interpretation of the marebito. On the one hand, Origuchi cites 
a few examples of “rare visitors” from the Man’yōshū and the Nihongi. The reference in 
the text to the celebration of the building of the new house (murohogi) appears in vol. 
11 of the Man’yōshū, in what is probably a folk ballad in the style of a sedōka, in which 
describes the visit of a holy stranger to the newly built sacred hall. The stranger is 
referred to as kimi, indicating his higher rank. In a second sedōka, the visitor is offered 
the body of a sacred dancer, a custom originally referr d to in the Nihongi (reign of 
emperor Ingyō).4 On the other hand, though Origuchi submits that even in pre-Meiji 
Japan the presence of marebito-associated local festivities was drastically reduced, in 
peripheral areas like Okinawa (Ryukyu), or inland Japan, festivals were still being 
carried out in a recognizable manner. Among the variety of marebito-figures found in 
Japanese folklore, those in coastal areas are popularly believed to come from beyond the 
sea, from the Pure Land of Amida. In many cases the role of marebito is performed at 
festivals by men who wear masks and clothes that identify them as kami. The main role 
of the marebito (literary or performative) is to recite magical words of blessing for the 
inhabitants of a dwelling, or the protection of new crops, usually at the setsubun 
festivity. The nature of the marebito differs; he may be a kami visiting from faraway, 
the spirit of an ancestor coming from the netherland, or a shaman-type performer who 
incarnates a marebito at a festival. In this way Origuchi posits a k mi-prototype stating 
that the references found in classical literature and the festivals actually held in 
                                                
4 See W. G. Aston, Nihongi, Tuttle 1972, I, 318: “At that time it was the custom at a banquet for the 
dancer, when the dance was ended, to turn to the person who occupied the highest place, and say, ‘I offer 
thee a woman’.” Origuchi does not quote it, but in theNihongi there is another very explicit reference to a 
“dedication celebration for a new house” (niimurohogi) in the second year of the reign of Emperor Seinei, 
which included a “house-blessing formula” (murohogi). See PHILIPPI 1990, 13-14, 80. 
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peripheral areas of Japan are connected: the latterbeing remnants of the former, the 
former being earlier archetypes of the latter. 
  In connection with the Man’yōshū quotations referred to above and the “Hitachi no 
kuni fūdoki,” Origuchi finds a secondary source for marebito in the “Ōtono hokai” 
festival (Engishiki “Kunaishō”). Here the priests Imbe and Nakatomi “visit” the Yin and 
Yang Gates of the Palace and enact a “marebito” ritual which originates in the folk 
customs represented in the Man’yōshū and Fūdoki. To quote: 
 
The original meaning of the marebito refers to a kami. It is a kami who comes at 
appointed times. It is a kami believed by villagers to come from the sky and from 
beyond the seas to certain villages, where it brings about bounteous things, wealth, 
and good fortune. This kami was not the product of a religious imagination. The 
villagers of antiquity had actually heard the “noisy” visit of the marebito pushing 
against the doors of houses.5  
 
For Origuchi then marebito is a primitive notion about a kami-type spirit, but of a 
peculiar character that belongs neither to the amatsukami nor to the kunitsukami groups 
found in the old texts. According to Origuchi’s explanations, the original or early 
marebito was neither a kami (god) of the sky (the Takamagahara) nor one of the land, 
but was, instead, a being from an “outer world,” a place beyond the sea called tokoyo no 
kuni. This kind of religious belief predated the appearance of the centralised Shinto 
system of the Takamagahara pantheon, and situates the marebito-type kami in the 
position of ancestors of the great kami of the Yamato court pantheon. Here Origuchi is 
clearly looking for nothing less than the arkhé, the religious foundation of Japanese 
culture. The popular association of the marebito with the ancestor spirits of families is 
also derivative and not original. Finally, a striking point in the text analyzed here is that, 
as spiritual entities marebito are heard and not seen. 
  In “Jokeishi no hassei” (‘The origin of narrative poems’, 1925), Origuchi cites a 
narrative poem from the Nihongi, reign of emperor Kenzō, that includes a “blessing 
formula for a (new) building” (muroyogoto).6 Commenting a second similar instance, 
Origuchi explains as follows: 
 
The way of attending the new building by the one who performs as kami, holds the 
rank of kami, and so believes himself to be one, was gradually forgotten, and in 
the Yamato area during the Asuka period, a person who as regarded as of a 
higher rank than the household in question was hosted as a marebito, and as such 
watched the dance of the maibito, naturally listened to the chant recitation, and 
was expected to take the maiden dancer as a wife for one night stay at the house. 
This is seen in the Nihongi, reign of emperor Ingyō. (OSz, Vol. 1, 431) 
 
The formulas in “praise of the marebito” that are found in among other sources the 
Manyōshū quotations, also seemed to be a part of the old tradition, which later became 
obsolete and developed into the common uchiage or naorai. The point here, according 
to Origuchi, is that the inhabitants of old Japan were mentally open to the “exterior” 
(gaikai), the “non-human” (jinji igai ), and were not prone to the deviations of 
subjectivity (jun-kyakkan taido). These people of the ancient age (kodaijin) are not the 
Japanese of the classical era however, and though they share the psychological 
                                                
5 OSz, vol. 2, 35. Translation from HAROOTUNIAN 1988, 429, modified to better fit the original. 
6 See Nihongi (I), 380-381. The corresponding passage in the Kojiki includes a different poem, with no 
character of muro-yogoto (see Kojiki, 370-371). 
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characteristics of people of the Nara period, such as the masurao type represented by 
Kamo no Mabuchi, they are even older and are in fact their predecessors. And the only 
access we have to their actual appearance is throug the oldest extant fragmentary 
pieces of classical literature of the type found in the previously mentioned Manyōshū 
(vol. 11) and the narrative poems in the Nihongi. 
  Origuchi develops extensively for the first time his marebitoron in part 3 of the series 
of essays under the collective title “Kokubungaku no hassei” (Part 3, 1926, 3-62). 
Under the heading of “Marebito no igi” (‘The meaning of marebito’), he explains the 
meaning of the term in relation to other words or ntions like “kyaku” (visitor) or 
“tokoyo,” and generally situates the figure of marebito in the context of Japanese 
religious festivals (matsuri) in which it shows its potential for significance. 
 
Interpreting kyaku as marebito is something which dates from the beginning of our 
country’s literature. In the etymological interpretation, up to the present day, 
marebito was used to mean “someone who comes rarely,” including the sense of a 
welcome guest (chinkyaku); marahito/marōdo are thought to be phonetical 
variations. From the formal point of view, this is certainly correct. However, the 
content ― its lexical use by the ancients, cannot be discerned unless the 
implication of its etymology is expanded. (OSz, vol. 1, 3) 
 
Certainly, from the viewpoint of the shintoist percption of the material manifestation of 
an invisible spiritual power (reii), the word mare designates one of the unequivocal 
signs of the numinous ―the “rare.” From the many examples found in Shinto literature 
and shrine worship, we may conclude that any natural object, human or non-human, 
which shows a trace of distinction possesses the attributes of the kami-nature. Origuchi 
finds in the marebito or “rare visitor,” the unmistakable manifestation of a kami 
presence. This is why the “rare visitor” becomes a “unique” presence and is received as 
a welcome guest by the household and the community. Origuchi finds evidence for this 
use of marebito in the Kokinshū expression “toshi ni mare naru hito,”7 which compares 
the visit of a lover to the cherry tree, which bloss ms only once a year. Here the 
presence of the visitor is not just rare but “unique,” and hence highly “esteemed,” 
according to Origuchi’s reading of the poem. In the same sense, other examples of using 
the variants “maro” or “mari” are found in the Nihongi.8 In all, the keywords for 
marebito are “honor,” “rare,” and “novel.” Origuchi moreover a gues that “hito” in old 
times referred not only to humans but also to “kami.” In conclusion, he states that 
according to its archaic occurrence, “marebito” refe s to a kami who comes from the 
tokoyo.9 
  In this way the marebito is received as an “honored” guest and occupies a special place 
at ancient banquet ceremonies held at shrines. At homes, as the archaic meaning of the 
term “aruji” (shujin) indicates, the term originally referred to the custom of 
“entertaining someone as one’s guest” and was a respectful expression for the guest and 
not the host. He was treated in special ways that were taboo to other people. According 
to Origuchi, the people incarnating the marebito belonged to three classes: people with 
the appearance of kami (shinjin), performers, and beggars. They might perform, for 
instance, like Heian practitioners of yin-yang, uttering powerful words of blessing for 
                                                
7 Kokinshū nr. 62: adanari to na ni koso tatere, sakurabana, toshi ni marenaru hito mo machikeri: “these 
cherry blossoms, whom men call evanescent, flighty patiently (sic), they’ve awaited one who comes, but 
rarely in each year” (trans. L. R. Rodd/M. C. Henkeius 1996). 
8 As quoted in OSz vol. 1, 4. 
9 See OSz vol. 1, 5. 
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the household and stamping the ground to counter resistance to their magical word-
binding on the part of the spirits of the soil. The special appointed time for their 
appearance was the New Year’s prelude to spring, thoug  during the Nara period, they 
were expected to return in the autumn to take part in the new harvest offering (niiname), 
on which occasion the marebito were required to bless the new buildings 
(niimurohokai); this served as the original model for the auspicious purification ritual 
(kichijibarae) performed for the coming year. They also acted as heralds of the new 
season. In Okinawa the belief in the visit of mountain spirits during the rites of spring is 
of the marebito type. As interpreted by Origuchi, this also served as the basis for the 
bon festival, when the ancestor spirits came from somewhere beyond the sea, namely 
the tokoyo, a sacred place where all types of visitors possess piritual power (reiryoku). 
The belief that the marebito came from the mountains or the heavens is derivative. But 
the belief in the marebito as a spiritual force (tama) belongs to the domain of the sacred 
source of energy, whose power may be beneficial, but whose maliciousness (jaki) must 
be averted in connection with the practice of harae in the liminal time of seasonal 
change.10 For the “visitor” (otozurebito) could turn into a “blessing spirit” (kotohogu 
kami), or just as well into a “cursing spirit” (soshiru kami). In all cases the marebito 
belief was associated with the pre-modern custom of hospitality.11  
  In the sequel to “Kokubungaku no hassei,” the fourth delivery of the series, written in 
the same year (1926), the notion of marebito is again linked to that of the tokoyo and the 
magic of words. Origuchi states: 
 
The incantatory formulas performed by the marebito coming from the tokoyo 
evolved gradually, and an incantation from heaven, which is a celestial norito, 
came to be performed. (OSz vol. 1, 135). 
 
  The point in this brief passage is in the contrast between the “incantatory formulas” 
and the “norito,” and between the tokoyo and heaven. As is known, orthodox Shinto 
theology discards the old magic formulas in favor of the kind of ritual prayers called 
norito. From the thirties on, the governmental Shinto establishment started restricting 
the magical practices performed at mountain villages in northern Japan. Several years 
earlier Origuchi had already shown a lucid understanding of the coming conflict, and 
proposed the preeminence, from the point of view of an archeology of knowledge, of 
the magical power of the world of the marebito, over the diluted, and in any case, 
derivative nature of the politically sanctioned ritual practices of the norito. This caused 
an inversion in the understanding of both norito and the Takamagahara, and placed the 
numinous strength derived from the tokoyo in a deeper and more fundamental position. 
  The year 1927 shows a change of tone in Origuchi’s t eories on marebito. In two 
related essays, his sources for evidence are not so much literature as folklore, with a 
notable reference to his master Yanagita Kunio. In the first essay, “Okina no hassei” 
(The Origin of the Okina, 1927), Origuchi traces the roots of dengaku to the primordial 
presence of the marebito in the specific ritual context of the festivals for the change of 
season. The marebito takes the shape of an old man or woman, and the kami, who visit 
the community only on these festivals, are seen by Origuchi as representations of 
marebito. 
 
The marebitogami who visit rarely or frequently, originally appeared only at the 
point of seasonal transitions during the year. (OSz, Vol. 2, 374) 
                                                
10 For the notion of “liminality” and its role in the formation of the community, see DAVIS 1975. 
11 The above paragraph is based on OSz vol. 1, 7-62. 
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In Origuchi’s understanding, the marebito is not defined so much as a prototype or 
character with recognisable features, as from the sp cial place it occupies in the 
symbolic topology from where it originates, which is to say, the special place of 
intersection between two worlds, and the special time when this intersection is possible. 
The one aspect that is clear about the figure the marebito reveals is its heteromorphism, 
its “difference”, which is concomitant with a special type of spiritual power (mono). For 
this reason, the marebito cannot be ascribed to any particular religious body, it is 
external to any organised religious system, be it Shintoist, Buddhist, or Shinto-Buddhist 
syncretism, and precedes all of them.12 
  In the same vein, in “Muramura no matsuri: Matsuri no hassei” (‘Village festivals: The 
origin of festivals’, Part II, 1927), Origuchi notes: 
 
The marebito who come to the spring festival can be understood as kami, but they 
can also be understood as invisible spiritual entiti s (rei). (OSz, Vol. 2, 458) 
 
Later they are seen as ancestor spirits, demons, or mountain creatures, which appear in 
diverse guises, but their original shape is that of he numinous marebito. In this way 
Origuchi finds evidence for his marebitoron not only in the classics of literature, but 
also in religious folklore, as befits his apprenticeship with Yanagita. 
  An occasional reference to marebito in “Uta no hanashi” (Talking about poetry, 1929) 
brings to a close the first seven years in Origuchi’s writings on the subject. Here he 
refers to the nativists Kamo no Mabuchi and Ueda Akinari to argue an important point 
concerning the perception of marebito as it appears in poetry. 
 
Marebito refers to a guest of ours, but in the older sense is rather an unusual 
person who visits rarely. The wild goose is seen as a bird of passage, a rare visitor. 
But this is not in an allegorical sense, since the goose directly incarnates a 
marebito, thus eliminating any impression of vagueness. (OSz, Vol. 11, 112)  
 
This quote shows again the heteromorphic nature of the notion of marebito, which is not 
prone to any sort of anthropomorphic interpretation. Its numinous essence can also be 
manifested in a proto-human or a zoomorphic form rather than central kami in the 
imperial (Takamagahara) pantheon or a Buddha-like hotoke or demon. This is because 
of the main topological reference for the marebito: the goose comes from the tokoyo, 
which makes it a marebito. The kami abiding in the Takamagahara region or the kami of 
the land (Japan) cannot be marebito, nor can the boddhisatvas arriving from Buddhist 
paradises, the demons or ghosts emanating from the infernal regions, or the souls of 
ancestors visiting from the land of the dead. These are taken to be marebito by villagers, 
but this is in a derivative sense, and does not provide us with an understanding of the 
original archetype.   
  In sum, from the point of view of our interest in the notion of marebito as the ground 
for a possible philosophical conception of certain originality, the description offered so 
far provides us with several clues. First, more than anything else, marebito is a 
“meaningful word”, that is, an ancient word, the analysis of which enables us to enter a 
hidden region of meaning not present in ordinary language. Second, the meaningful 
reality to which it points is transcendental; it points to a separate realm not accessible in 
ordinary daily living. But the connection of this realm to our present world is essential 
                                                
12 For the allusion to the marebito as the “original buddha”, under the historical figures of Buddhist 
masters of esoteric arts, see OSz vol.2, 403. 
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to the very survival of this world. Essence is separated from being. Third, our 
knowledge of this reality is a legacy from the past. This implies a second-degree, 
historical separation from the source, that is, a separation of place and time. Fourth, as a 
consequence, the utopian character of the notion is reinforced. This is shown by popular 
imagery associated with utopian lands, like the Pure Land of Amida or the Tokoyo. 
Fifth, in a symbolic topology of inversion, periphery is meaningful here, and not 
centrality. Or to put it in another way, meaning comes from the exterior, not the interior. 
In this sense, we have the complementary opposition between the domestic realm and 
its externality. The main feature of this exterior is its non-domestic wildness, its 
heteromorphism. Liminality plays an important role in this topology. Sixth, the oldest 
marebito appears as a performer, who chants and dances. The way to meaning is 
mediated through social interplay, social exchange between the human and the non-
human, within a dramatic space. Seventh, the marebito-spirit is primordial. Eighth, it is 
invisible, yet perceptible. It is a distinct presenc . Ninth, the ritual originally associated 
with the marebito is related to architecture, the blessing of a building serving as a 
metonymy for the protection of their inhabitants. This places marebito in the group of 
“guardian spirits” of the family and the community. Tenth, subjectivity in a sense that 
identifies the modern is excluded. Instead, we finda kind of objectivity understood as 
absolute transparency, exteriority, rituality, non-duality between the individual and the 
community (the household), and conceived as a way to overcome the modern but 
beyond any sort of historicism, since the model is archetypal, almost pre-historical, or in 




  The year of Origuchi’s first attempt to formulate a marebitoron (1923), was also the 
year when notions regarding the essence of Japanese people, or Japanese culture were 
published. Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962), Origuchi’s senior in folklore studies, offered 
an early version of his notion of jōmin as an alternative to the former, through the 
publication of his Kyōdoshiron (‘Theory on the ethnography of the countryside,’ 1923). 
The term presents a striking contrast to marebito, in that Yanagita’s jō- (“usual”) is the 
exact opposite to mare- (“unusual”). Quest for nativism may be explained by his 
personal failure as a member of the Mandate Administrat on Committee of the League 
of Nations which met at Geneva between 1921 and 1923. By the time he r turned to 
Japan, the seed for Yanagita’s ideas on nativism had already been planted.13 The result 
was the gradual formation of a new image of the Japanese through the notion of jōmin. 
In this Yanagita fled from his former attachment to he fantastic, or the preternatural, in 
folk tales, an approach perhaps more akin to Origuchi’s work. The Great Kanto 
Earthquake that same year no doubt added a sense of urgency and realism. However, 
Yanagita’s aspiration to a conception of Japan as anational community would not be 
self-evident at a time when social disrupture betwen company entrepreneurs and urban 
labourers lingered from the Taisho era.14 Proof of this was the mass killing of Koreans 
and leftist activists in the aftermath of the earthquake.15 In all, 1923 displayed a marked 
                                                
13 See INOUE 2007, 72. 
14 See A. Gordon’s  reference to the diary of one such laborer in relation to the “communal feeling” in 
VLASTOS 1998.  
15 It is not irrelevant that the same year saw the publication of Kita Ikki’s An Outline Plan for the 
Reorganization of Japan (Nihon kaizō hōan taikō, which was soon banned). The publication in the of G. 
Lukacs’ History and Class Consciousness (1923) would also be noted in Japan. See chronology in 
FUJITA 1997. 
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contrast between the new urban living as the model for a modern Japan, centering on 
cosmopolitan Tokyo, and the nostalgic reaction for a premodern sense of a kind of 
identity that was already lost.16 
  In 1926 we find an unexpected turn in Origuchi’s ideas on the etymology of marebito: 
the opposition between “tsune” and “mara”, which he draws from an old song,17 in 
which “tsune” is interpreted as “permanent residence” or “continuity” (“Kokugaku no 
hassei”). If we look at his comments from the point of view of Yanagita’s theory of 
jōmin, the contrast between the two notions is striking. Certainly the “ordinary folk” 
represent that part of Japanese society which has not changed, and for which change is a 
threat; it has been the permanent element throughout historical change. The continuity 
of tradition is the safeguard of a national essence, and it is this and nothing else that 
jōmin means in the last analysis. Against this, mare/mara is merely the occasional and 
discontinuous. In the text here referred, Origuchi does not draw from Yanagita’s work, 
but if he did, the result would not be a mutual contradiction but the revelation of 
complementary opposites. 
  For Yanagita, the search for a prototype in Japanese culture of a similar foundational 
nature as Origuchi’s “Japanese of antiquity” (kodaijin), leads him to turn his original 
interest in the remote dwellers of the mountain villages (yamabito) to the “ordinary 
people.”18 Moreover, during the thirties, Yanagita defines the jōmin as “rice farmers.”19 
In fact, we can easily discern the symbolic complementarity between the figures of the 
marebito and the jōmin in that, in a ritual context, the former typically visits the latter 
from the outside boundary of the space occupied by the farming village, the latter 
playing on these occasions the role of host, and the established time for these periodical 
visits being related to the vital moments in the planting and cropping of rice. Yanagita’s 
jōmin, however, is not what is represented by present day Japanese farmers. Modernity 
has affected even rural areas, and as a consequence nwritten traditions have been 
forgotten. For this model Yanagita turned to Edo period rice-farming villages, where 
about seventy percent of the population belonged to this category.20 We should note that 
by the time Yanagita developed his theory, Origuchi had spent more than a decade 
developing his own marebitoron; this notwithstanding, Yanagita ignored the possible 
relation between his ideas on jōmin and Origuchi’s marebito. Yanagita himself 
eventually dismissed Origuchi’s notion as too conceptual, without a clear historical 
reference, and too artificial. Just as Yanagita failed to show any interest for the other 
categories of the Japanese not included in the maincategory of jōmin, such as the non-
jōmin, the hi-nin, the eta, or the socially discriminated dealers in the busine s of blood 
and death, aas well as upper class families with hereditary names,21 we must also count 
the marebito as i-jin (‘rare people’), even though Origuchi explains that this is not a 
human but a kami. The relevant issue here is that from Origuchi’s heterogeneous logic, 
the very possibility of formulating a theory of jōmin calls for the complementary role of 
the marebito. Yanagita, in his turn, is centered on the quest for a homogeneous notion 
of Japaneseness,22 and the role played in relation to this by the cult of ancestors does not 
provide at all a scheme with the tension we find in Origuchi’s argument. Moreover, if 
                                                
16 A detailed description of this new modern lifestyle thriving in the Tokyo of 1923 is found in 
HAROOTUNIAN 2000. 
17 See OSz Vol. 1, 4. 
18 See FIGAL 1999, 140. 
19 OHNUKI-TIERNEY 1999. 
20 See MIYATA 1996. 
21 See the criticism on this point from Japanese ethnology, as summed up by MIYATA 1996, 64-71. 
22 For a criticism of the homogeneous character of jōmin from the point of view of gender studies in 
sociology, see HAROOTUNIAN 2000. 
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marebito is indeed a contrived intellectual artifact, at least the word belongs to the 
Japanese lexicon, whereas Yanagita’s jōmin is simply a word he made up. In his ideas 
on jōmin, we can perceive Yanagita’s excessive “normalising” drive, which results in 
another no less archetypical notion than Origuchi’s marebito. For the latter Yanagita 
could not identify the term clearly with any given social class in his own day, that being 
because he was perhaps looking for a “normative” Japanese rather than a common 
peasant, that is, Japaneseness itself as a norm. 
  Yanagita did not perceive the lexical opposition between “ordinary people” and “rare 
visitor” as mutually reinforcing but rather as mutually exclusive. And in this perception 
the difference in each kokugaku scholar’s project reveals its main contrast. For while 
Origuchi was trying to ground national existence in the exchange with the “other”, 
Yanagita was trying to exclude otherness, and because of this he postulated the souls of 
ancestors, which were conceived by the jōmin as kami, as the religious foundation of the 
nation, which means a legitimation of the jōmin proposition from the point of view of 
ethnic self-identity.23 
  Thus far, from the point of view of a semiotics of cultural meaning, we have identified 
Origuchi’s marebitoron as other-centred, in opposition to “sameness” or self-
centredness in Yanagita’s jōmin. By coincidence, the year that Origuchi’s marebitoron 
was conceived, was itself crucial in the field of the new hermeneutics of culture, or 
theories of otherness in Europe. These theories influe ced disciplines as varied as the 
philosophy of values or the philosophy of dialogue, philosophy of religion and theology, 
philosophy of culture, philosophy of science and epist mology, history of philosophy, 
the sociology of knowledge, philosophical and cultural anthropology, psychoanalysis 
and psychological phenomenology, existential phenomenology and hermeneutics itself. 
Among the works now considered classics in the groundbreaking philosophy of the 
“other”, M. Buber’s Ich und Du (1923) occupies a special place. 
  But before analyzing Buber’s work, we should first e tablish the contextual limits of 
our discussion: 1923 was a moment in Europe when th question of identity, personal, 
national or transnational, was perceived very sharply, especially in the aftermath of the 
political, cultural and intellectual turmoil that followed World War I. The twenties were 
a period for reconstruction in every sense of the word and in all arenas; the need for a 
new start was direly felt. And the great danger, the great threat was none other than 
exclusionism and solipsism in the guise of various nationalistic agendas. At the same 
time Europeans were questioning what it meant to be European. In Japan, Origuchi was 
asking the question of what does it mean to be Japanese. For the former, it was the 
problem of citizenship, for the latter, the problem of ethnicity.24 Europe is posed as a 
problem directly, or is always felt in the background in Buber and the other authors 
whom we propose to analyse here. For Origuchi Japan is the problem, the stimulus in 
this case being the disillusion with modernization that was acutely felt by many 
intellectuals of the epoch, and the deep sense of cultural crisis, the threat of a loss of 
identity. The context is perceived in both cases as a crisis of the model of modernization, 
and new prospects are expected. Hospitality will eventually be discovered in the roots 
of the formation of Europe as a cultural project wih a given identity, in much the way 
                                                
23 A possible way of looking at both concepts within a single framework would have been to apply the ke 
= “common”/hare = reinvigoration theory, in which jōmin would function as ke and marebito as hare. 
The framework has been posited by Yanagita. In The Monkey as Mirror, Ohnuki-Tierney discusses the 
opposition “profane” (ke) vs. “sacred” (hare) as basic in the formation of Japanese identity since the Edo 
period, through the formation of “self” = ke vs. “other” = hare, being the marebito a representative of the 
latter. See OHNUKI-TIERNEY, 129. 
24 See with respect to the relevance of the problem of “European citizenship” a recent updating in Pliegos 
de Yuste  no. 9-10, 2009. Digital edition in English at www.pliegosdeyuste.eu. 
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hospitality becomes the basic semiotics of exchange between the community and the 
marebito. There is finally the problem of the dichotomy national-immigrant. Just as 
nations are formed by national members who aspire to thnical purity, Europe as a 
transnational entity is formed to an extent by immigrants, people who have been 
displaced geographically, ethnically, and intellectually. What would be the role of the 
marebito was it to be seen as an immigrant from the tokoyo? Of course, the marebito is 
a visitor, and in this sense it does not become integrated with the community. But if we 
consider the periodicity of his visits, his relationship with the community acquires a 
permanence and the right to be considered a “foreign” part of the community itself, like 
an extension of itself to its own exterior. We propose to analyse the dichotomy of 
national-immigrant in its proper context as a tensio  nside the community which 
belongs to its own identity as community, in the culturally different conditions of 
Europe and Japan during this historically critical period. 
  Buber’s I and Thou25 (Ich und Du, 1923), is generally considered the foundational 
grammar for the so-called “philosophy of dialogue.” From the point of view of the 
context we have just outlined, the character of the text as an answer to the danger of 
stagnating solipsism in the European intellectual world becomes apparent. If Origuchi 
resorts to the language of Yamato as restated throug  the tool of hermeneutics and 
etymology, Buber resorts to language in its primary character as the linguistic 
foundation of existence. The crisis of material culture as the consequence of a 
problematic process in modernity leads both authors t  language as the basis of 
consciousness and identity. Buber finds that the exit from solipsism is already given in 
the dialogic structure of our linguistic consciousne s, since the notion of the “I” never 
stands on its own but is always found and given meaning in its relational interplay with 
the “you” and the “it” (transformed into a “he” or “she”). Solipsism can never be a point 
of departure, as in the rational edifice inherited from Descartes; it can be nothing but a 
disrupture from its original place, the perversion of displacement. The discovery of the 
“I” through its interplay with the “you” is not arbitrary. The identity of the “you” is 
always veiled. The “you” becomes completely different from the “I”, that is, the nature 
of the “you” is to be an “other”. In “you”, the “I” makes the discovery of “the other,” 
absolute otherness. This implies that the “you” unveils itself as transcendence, for the 
“you” can never be produced or controlled by the “I”, unless it is first changed into an 
“it”. In the dialogic relationship between the “I” and “you” some other traits come to the 
surface, like an anticipation, or surprise. For the “you” is autonomous from the “I”, and 
the “I” cannot anticipate or submit the “you’s” operation to any scheme of its own. The 
only way open for development in the dialogical relationship is the “acceptance of 
otherness.”26 The “I’s” (subject) existential structure is rooted in its “openness to 
otherness.” This otherness reveals itself as non-recognisable in the previous I-
experience; it is a “strange otherness” on which the recognition of otherness as 
“different-ness” is based. The “you” as other is then a non-I, the negation of the “I”. But 
in its negation, it becomes to be essentially bound to the most primary act of cognition. 
From this existential acknowledgement springs a sense of “respect for otherness.”27 It is 
                                                
25 One may object to the English translation of “du” as “you” rather than “Thou” (as we find in Cl. Martin, 
in Dreyfus, H. L./Wrathall, M. A., eds. 2009, A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism, Wiley-
Blackwell, p.200). From the author’s point of view, the problem is that the English title anticipates what 
we will find after an analysis of the work. But the ierarchical relation between the “I” and “Thou” helps 
us to connect it with the “culture of hospitality” to which it properly belongs. 
26 An expression incorporated later by Buber, in 1965. See CISSNA/ANDERSON 2002. 
27 For this expression see W. B. Pearce “Achieving Dialogue with ‘the Other’ in the Postmodern World”, 
in Gaunt, P. (ed. 1993) Beyond Agendas: New Directions in Communication Research, Greenwood, 59-
74. Also for the expressions “openness to otherness”, “strange otherness”, and “differentness” seeCissna, 
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here that the “you” is revealed as a “Thou”, and the mutual relation acquires a new 
meaning, as it is expressed from the beginning in the usual English translation of 
Buber’s classic. For the “Thou” becomes a meta-subjective space pointing to the 
transcendent ground of the world to which the “I” belongs. In every “you”, there is a 
“Thou”. This discovery leads us to “celebrate otherness.”28 
  In Buber’s dialogical view, “I” does not only encounter other “I’s”, but “I” also 
encounters the world as “other”. In this way, the world that sustains the intersubjectiv  
realm is itself constructed through otherness. The world is then the place where “I” 
recognize myself, but it is also a world of strangeess, for it is not a construction of my 
fancy. In recognizing the world this way, “I” operate a process which may be called 
“making the other strange.”29 The “other”, including other “I’s” and the whole world 
that sustains them, is itself grounded on the “Other”. 30 This explains how we have 
recognized every other “you” as “Thou”, which takes the relational haphazardness of 
our present to the dimension where we meet the “eternal Thou”. This line of reflection 
in Buber’s more theological vein was later developed by G. Marcel, who contributed the 
notion of “‘receptivity’ to the “Other”, in the sense that one might actively receive a 
guest.”31 This notion of “receptivity” in the sense of “receiving” the other as “guest” 
will certainly strike the reader for its similarity with the basic relational attitude we find 
in the context of “receiving” the marebito as “guest”. We are exploring whether we can 
understand the marebito figure through the notion of otherness; that is, whether we can 
appropriate the presence of the marebito through its difference from us, as an “other”. 
Origuchi senses the character of that presence in the way the “I” = “community” relates 
with the marebito. Proper relational context,  that of the ritual mode of relation, gives us 
a definite pattern, whereby the “I” = community, rep sented in the person of the head 
of the household, the head of the village, or the head-priest at the sanctuary, “receives” 
the marebito as a stranger, honors it as a “guest”, and treats him/her as “Thou”. From 
this basic relational pattern, Origuchi concludes that the marebito can be none other 
than a kami, just as Buber finds the sacred dimension supporting the relational bond. 
  In the field of psychoanalysis, the relational bond with “the other” is internalised, and 
as a result it is melded in the “I’s” inner mental processes; the reference to the objective 
world is subsumed into the subjective space. In Freud’s The Ego and the Id (Das Ich 
und das Es, 1923) the “I” changes into an “ego”, a subjective construct of 
consciousness32 which finds its opposite in the unconscious field of the id. In this way 
the full circle stands within the walls of the “I’s” mind. Certainly the ego experiences 
“strangeness” towards the id, which springs from a source which is not under its control, 
as well as towards the external world, which becomes an outer source of demands. This 
feeling of strangeness is not resolved in the encouter with the “you”. The only “you” is 
perceived rather as a “he/she” that is incorporated into the conscious structure of the ego, 
through internalization and objectification of the figures of “father” and “mother” in the 
                                                                                                                                    
K. N./Anderson, R. (2002) Moments of Meeting: Buber, Rogers, and the Potential for Public Dialogue, 
SUNY Press. 
28  Sampson 1993, quoted in CISSNA/ANDERSON 2002, 93. 
29 Following Gurevitch, Z. D. (1988) “The Other Side of Dialogue: On Making the Other Strange and the 
Experience of Otherness” in American Journal of Sociology no. 93, 1179-1199. 
30 Buber states that “Every real relation in the world is exclusive, the Other breaks in on it and avenges its 
exclusion” (BUBER 1923/2004, 76). 
31 Quoted in Cooper, Mick (2003) Existential Therapies: Using Evidence for Policy and Practice, SAGE, 
28. 
32 In this sense Freud preferred the term “Ich” to “ego”, since the former is connected to consciousness 
and self-reflection. “Ego” can be translated in German as der Einzige (the single one), as in Max Stirner’s 
The Ego and his Own (1844). 
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super-ego. Although the ego strives to keep the mind connected to the external world, 
and has no support in the relational field with a “you”, it easily lapses into failure and 
the field of psychopathology opens up.33 The real problem with this ego is that, having 
no relational connection with “others”, it cannot overcome by itself the condition of 
solipsism, which reflects a general mentality in intellectual circles in 1923 and opposes 
the more hopeful view that we find in phenomenological or hermeneutical thought 
patterns. Certainly the go connects the “I” to its exterior, but finds no counterpart in 
that exterior, and there is no communicative pattern o assist it;34 monologue substitutes 
for dialogue. In the field of contemporary psychopathology, it is generally 
acknowledged that Freud’s notion of the ego is subjected to a drive/structure model that 
is in opposition to an alternative relational/strucure model.35 In the last analysis, the 
external world is not even an open structure from which hope is instilled in the “I’s” 
mind, but another source of threat to the ego.36 In Origuchi’s view, the bipolarity of the 
external world as a source of blessings for the “I”=community, as well as a possible 
source for adversity is acknowledged in the dual chracter of the marebito, a figure that 
will later be developed according to the kokugaku theory of the spiritual entity called 
tama.37 This explains, according to Origuchi, the emergence of many local traditions 
where ritual behaviour is required to guarantee the favor of the tama/marebito. In the 
original view, however, the marebito plays an outstanding role as a guardian spirit 
which comes from beyond the community’s perimeter, and in this way local 
communities, although isolated geographically, are able to connect to a hopeful source 
of meaning. The threat would rather be in losing contact with this external source of 
vital energy and therefore falling into stagnation.38 As a conclusion, we can make a 
distinct contrast between Freud’s approach to the notio  of the “other” as a threat to the 
ego, and Origuchi’s approach to a possible notion of the “other” as protector of the 
“I”=community. 
  In the same year, Max Scheler claimed in The Nature of Sympathy (Wesen und Formen 
der Sympathie, 1923) that he had found the solution to the problem of the ego and 
solipsism. For Scheler, sympathy and love are faculties in the human experience which 
serve as bridges between the self and others. Contrary to the radical polarization of self 
vs. other, or inner self vs. external world, Scheler shows the artificial and derivative 
character in the rise of the self as opposed to its ex erior. The enclosure of the ego in 
itself is a basic error of self-perception and of morality. Both self and other emerge from 
a common stream of vital experience, indistinguishable and primary. Inner self and 
exterior world are identified in the original, primordial experience. It is here that the 
possibility of raising the perception of the existenc  of the “other” as a value to the self 
is grounded. And through this realization all forms of ego-centeredness and solipsism 
                                                
33 As acknowledged by Freud, the ego is the only window of the “I” to the external world: “Whereas the 
ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it 
as the representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the ideal will, as we 
are now prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is psychical, 
between the external world and the internal world” (in FREUD 1986, 459). 
34 To Freud the ego is that part of the id “modified by the direct influence of the external world” (in Ford, 
D. H./Urban, H. B., 1998, Contemporary Models of Psychotherapy: A Comparative Analysis, John Wiley 
& Sons, 199-200). 
35 Notions presented by Greenberg, J. R./Mitchell, S. A. (1983) Object Relations in Psychoanalytic 
Theory, Harvard Usniversity Pre 
36 Freud depicts the go as “a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by 
three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the superego.” 
37 For the notion of aramitama in Origuchi, see OSz vol. 2, 359-362. 
38 This connects our argument to Origuchi’s view of theke/hare theoretical construction. For the notion of 
ke = “common” see OSz vol. 6, 137; for the notion of hare OSz vol. 17, 459. 
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are overcome. Scheler’s analysis will lead us later to the phenomenological approach of 
the Freiburg school of thought, in Husserl and Heidegger. But we must not fail first to 
notice that in Origuchi’s analysis of the dualism of c mmunity-as-self and marebito-as-
other, precisely what the latter contributes to the scheme is the permanent possibility of 
overcoming any form of self-centeredness, isolationist drive, or solipsistic self-
deterioration as fancies of an immature and morally deficient social self.  
  Contrary to Buber’s stance towards a philosophy of the “absolute other,” with an 
emphasis on its radical difference to the self,39 Scheler propounded a “relative other,” in 
the sense that the difference is not radical but it is subsumed under the common ground 
of a primary identification. What then, of the marebito-as-other? We would dare to 
ascribe marebito’s difference to radicality rather than to proximity, for according to the 
original shape of Origuchi’s marebitoron, there is no common ground to be shared 
between the community-as-self and the marebito. He/it is a total stranger, in appearance 
(ikeijin) as well as in substance (kami). Moreover, the marebito’s place of origin, the 
tokoyo, remarks radical exteriority in the marebito. We have argued that originally, the 
marebito was exclusively associated with the tokoyo, not to the heavens or the 
mountains, which later led to the image of the marebito as an ancestor spirit, or kami in 
the Shinto pantheon’s style. In contrast, the tokoyo represents a place of “absolute” 
alterity. We are talking then about the meeting of two different planes at one point in 
space and time, and not of a common sphere which inludes two poles that revolve 
around each other. This is why we find the “absolute” otherness in Buber more akin to 
Origuchi’s position than the “relative” view proposed by Scheler. This difference will 
also reflect itself in the ethical problem. For according to Scheler, it is the primary 
identity of the opposites of self and other which makes possible an ethics of otherness 
and sees the other as value. But from the point of view of Buber and Origuchi, what 
precisely makes valuable the contact with the other, b  it dialogical or ritual, is its 
radical irreducibility to the sphere of the self. This we may call the transcendent 
moment in the relational bound self-other. In all cses, however, an ethics of the other is 
necessarily raised. 
  The ethical moment is also present in E. Husserl, the most representative philosopher 
of the Freiburg school. Here, too, we discover that 1923 turns out to be a very 
significant year. The need to return to the foundation l moment of Europe as an 
intellectual culture40 is urgently felt in the first volume of his First Philosophy (Erste 
Philosophie, 1923). The book was written as a response to the deep sense of crisis of 
values in World War I in German intellectual circles.41 Just as Origuchi went back to 
archaic Japan, Husserl went back to ancient Europe to r write the history of ideas, and 
by relying on linguistic or conceptual analysis, sought to discover the clue for a fresh 
new start. Origuchi, an anti-modernist, believed the clue was hidden in the creases of 
time, and was only fragmentarily revealed in ancient texts, while the enlightened 
                                                
39 We are conscious that the full develpment of such a t eoretical  position is not found in Buber’s classic, 
but for that we have to wait until the emergence of Buber’s disciple, E. Lévinas, who porposed a theory of 
the “absolute Other” in Time and the Other (Le Temps et l’Autre, 1948), which falls beyond the scope of 
this essay. 
40 philosophischen Kultur. Today we have an increasing literature about the myth of the foundation of 
European philosophy by ancient Greece, a romantic ivention, but to bring this issue to our discussion 
would be completely anachronistic. See the author’s position in www.pensamientoglobal.com. 
41 Perhaps the epitome to this had been the release of Spengler’s The Decline of the West, just completed 
in 1922. On the other hand, Krisis will constitute a keyword in the philosophy of Husserl since this period 
until his last writings, as is evidenced in the title of his famous work of 1936, The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die 
Transzendentale Phänomenologie). 
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Husserl aspired to take a new, further step in the int llectual history of mankind. 
Moreover, Husserl relies entirely on consciousness,42 although not on the naturalistic 
conscious perception of the “psychological ego.” Against a closed, solipsistic 
understanding of the ego, Husserl propounds a “transce dental ego,” wherein a basis 
exists which will take us to the genesis of meaning, and in this way he negated the 
identification of “transcendental” with “transcendent”, the new science of consciousness 
being called “transcendental phenomenology.” In the search for a pure ego, the process 
towards the constitution of universal meaning start from “methodological solipsism” 
through self-analysis, in the Cartesian tradition. But the self immediately reveals its 
complete immersion and dependence on its environment, personal, cultural, and 
historical. The structure of the self is open, and this is called intentionality. As a result 
the self is only constituted in the realm of intersubjectivity.43 This is the space where the 
self encounters others, and through this encounter the ethical autonomy of man is itself 
constituted, in that the universal community of intellects gives itself its own destiny. 
The constitution of the community of men includes a plurality of worlds, among them 
the worlds of strangers, Fremdwelten. But universal communication is guaranteed, 
thanks to the human capacity for intersubjective empathy. In this manner, a “common 
factual world” (Erfahrungswelt) reveals itself as the unified place of intersubjectivity. 
  At the same time that Husserl undertook the reformulation of the edifice of European 
philosophy, he had the chance to appeal to a wider readership, when he was invited to 
contribute Five Essays on Renewal (1922-23) to the Japanese journal K izō. The term 
“renewal” becomes a transcultural term, comprehensible because of a common crisis of 
values in Japan as much as in Europe. The desire for newal was universally felt, but in 
different ways. Husserl has the chance to address both audiences (that is, Europe and 
Japan). Husserl sincerely believes that mankind as a whole can and must aspire to create 
a universal moral order that goes beyond cultural differences. Renewal means above all 
to situate mankind in ethical life, through rational interaction. The universal community 
is possible thanks to the dialogic, communicative nature of individuals, who are 
sensitive to their intersubjective context. But in fact, Husserl’s project is Eurocentric. 
Universal reason is at the opposite pole of Origuchi’s hermeneutic endeavour in that the 
Japanese language, the language of Yamato, is an irreducible source of meaning and 
cannot be translated into the language of universal reason. It is only through linguistic 
analysis that Origuchi made the discovery of the marebito-as-other. Therefore, the 
encounter with the marebito-as-other is not the result of transcendental analysis, but of a 
context of transcendence. The marebito-as-stranger does not belong to the universal 
community of intellects; its otherness is radical. Its character falls beyond the reach of 
phenomenological analysis. 
  In this sense, Heidegger’s stance as thinker of post-metaphysics is closer to our point. 
Compared to Husserl’s rationalism, Heidegger’s intent to overcome Husserl through 
ontological analysis is detectable since the same period, a period in which he separated 
himself from Husserl, his mentor, and which marked the beginning of the so-called 
Marburg phase. Curiously enough the lecture course written by Heidegger that year 
bears the name of Ontology (Ontologie, 1923), as a challenge to phenomenology. There 
are two points in which the intellectual world of Heidegger approaches that of Origuchi. 
First, Heidegger operates fully the linguistic turn in the field of phenomenology by 
introducing the hermeneutical method. In this, Heidegger goes beyond Husserl’s 
                                                
42 In First Philosophy, Husserl propounds “a philosophy of beginnings that institutes itself in the most 
radical philosophical self-consciousness”. Quoted in D. Moran, in Crowell, St./Malpas, J., eds. 2007, 
Transcendental Heidegger, Stanford University Press, 135. 
43 Defined in First Philosophy as “subjectivity in community with others.” 
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rationalism, in that linguistic hermeneutics aspires to understanding the irrational as 
well as the rational through textual analysis. Also, in textual analysis, the notion of 
progress wanes. Origuchi similarly chooses hermeneutics, in the nativist tradition, and 
relies almost entirely on textual linguistic analysis. Second, contrary to prgressiveness 
in Husserl, who tried to move forward, both Heideggr and Origuchi turned their 
intellectual gaze backwards and believed that meaning could not be construed but was 
already given. Moreover, Heidegger thought that meaning (or truth) was veiled, hidden, 
and remained in its purity only in the origin. Because of this, Heidegger wrote about the 
“forgiveness of Being” (= meaning, truth), ontology being the discipline about Being. 
Methodologically he returned to the origin of European philosophy and negated history. 
For him the presocratics, especially Parmenides, repres nted the pristine moment of the 
revelation of meaning. We have seen that Origuchi tried to establish a similar agenda. 
As anti-modern as Heidegger was postmodern, he did not rely on history either: for 
Origuchi meaning was to be recovered from the fragments pointing to the origin, just as 
Parmenides Poem was fragmentary. For both Origuchi and Heidegger, meaning was 
preserved in words, in ancient words, and the task was to extract meaning from 
etymology, the etymology that revealed the original meaning of otherness in the word 
marebito, the etymology that revealed the original meaning of both identity and 
difference in the Greek word to on. Meaning was in both cases a foundational semiotic 
act. 
  The 1923 text of Ontology consists of a basic outline of the topics that Heidegger 
developed more systematically in Being and Time. Here, too, we find the early shape of 
the basic tenets of several decisive problems that later raised Heidegger to critical 
acclaim. In relation to our query, we find a definite philosophy of others already present. 
The first point we will underline (Heidegger’s stress) is that meaning is mediated by 
others.44 Quoting Aristotle, he writes that meaning is attached to “authentic being” in 
the world.45 In hermeneutics the linguistic turn is fully operational. Meaning has to do 
with language in a communicative setting. In this context “the other” makes full 
appearance. In an early analysis of Dasein, “the other” shows the aspect of “other 
beings-which-are-there with him in the mode of life.” 46 In this way the analytics of 
Dasein, from the beginning, accounts for it in the necessary communal context of 
“being-with-each-other.”47 The Dasein encounters others in the everyday experience of 
encountering the world.48 The Dasein is never isolated. But, needless tos say the Dasein 
does not always easily identify any experience with ot er Dasein in a common world. 
There is room for the strange. However, here Heidegger does not develop an argument 
concerning the other as a “stranger”. He limits his analysis to a phenomenological 
account of the experience of the “strange” itself from the point of view of the nature of 
the encounter of Dasein with his world. The characteristics of the “strange” are 
unpredictability and incalculability. They unveil this world as contingent.49 In sum, in 
                                                
44 Heidegger reviews the history of hermeneutics in the first chapter, in which he quotes the use of of the 
word in the Sophist: “Apherméneue, ‘shall report about’: making known what the others mean.” (6). 
Heidegger takes a further step in emphasizing that meaning is given in a linguistic community. 
45 The quote goes: “Addressing and discussing something with others (conversation about something) 
exists in order to safeguard the authentic being of living beings (as they live in their world and by means 
of it).” (7). 
46 Ibid., 23. 
47 Ibid., 24. This shows, on the other hand, how unfair is the criticism of individualism in the notion of 
Dasein in Heidegger, as interpreted by Heidegger’s Japanese critics since T. Watsuji. 
48 “the others one has something to do with are also there in the everyday things being encountered” (75). 
49 “The strange is only (…) inexplicit familiarity insofar as it has been shaken up and awakened and is 
now being encountered in the character of unfamiliarity. (…) Through the disturbability of inexplicit 
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an ontology of encounter, the self-as-Dasein finds itself already in an intersubjective 
space of other selves. In this sense, Heidegger shows is lineage, that is, resulting from 
the phenomenological analysis we have found, his debt to the notion of intersubjectivity 
in Husserl. The difference is procedural. If Husserl takes the individual self as the unit 
of analysis, and from there tries to incorporate th reality of other selves, Heidegger 
starts from the community of selves from where he strives to arrrive at “authentic” 
individual self. In both cases, the analysis of individual being is mediated by the 
intersubjective field. With Husserl, this field is universal and not limited by cultural 
differences, since it is sustained by communicative reason. With Heidegger, this field is 
eminently cultural, defined by language, and consequently, sustained by linguistic 
national identity. In Ontology, as is the case with Husserl, there is no referenc to 
alterity beyond the problem of being-with-other. We should also call this analysis of the 
other “relative otherness,” in the sense that absolute alterity is excluded by principle, 
and that the focus of interest is centered on other selves, which is to say the element of 
otherness within the self in the domain of intersubjectivity. This leads to a field of 
analysis of the self-as-other, and conversely, the-ot r-as-self. The mediation of self and 
other is the key point here, and the encompassing instrument of analysis, that is,  
intersubjectivity, is what makes the ontological project possible. 
  Heidegger later confirmed his ideas in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927). Here 
again, he solved the problem already posed by Husserl about understanding others 
through the notion of “being-with” (Mitsein). 50 But there the seed for a different 
approach to the topic of otherness is also present, the direct encounter with Being. If 
Being has no content and cannot be translated into a y particular mode of being-in-the- 
world, then it must be represented as empty. Here the problem of the negation of being 
leads us to “absolute otherness” as non-being. Non-bei g then becomes “the nothing,” 
or “nihilation”. Still, in Being and Time, Heidegger does not develop his positive 
philosophy of nihilism, for which we will  have to wait until his intellectual turn known 
as Kehre. By 1923, Heidegger is still trying to cross the limits of the phenomenological 
approach to the topic of the “others”, and does not address as yet fully the problem of 
Being-as-Other.51 
  In Origuchi, we have seen that the source of being is in otherness, a statement that can 
be traced back to his marebitoron of 1923. So far, in our comparative analysis we have 
been able to discern two types of discourse regarding alterity. On the one hand, we have 
a kind of theoretical elaboration regarding the relation between the self and the “others”, 
who are recognised as other selves, in the unified realm called intersubjectvity, which is 
the material from which the community is made. We have called this type of approach 
“relative otherness,” but we might also call it “immanent otherness,” in the sense that 
                                                                                                                                    
familiarity, what is being encountered is there in its unpredictability, its incalculability. The there 
encountered has the peculiar rigidity of something oppressive, contingent” (77). Needless to say, it is 
precisely this contingent character that makes the world an open structure where événement can take place, 
as Heidegger’s French disciples have explained. 
50 Husserl had acknowledged that the phenomenological leap from experiencing one’s own self to 
experiencing the other’s self was a difficult problem for phenomenology. Heidegger starts his ontological 
analysis by negating the radicality of the distance between my experience and the other’s experience. He 
states: “...because Dasein's Being is Being-with [Mitsein], its understanding of Being already implies the 
understanding of Others” (HEIDEGGER 1927/1962, 161).    
51 In parallel with Heidegger’s turn to “facticity”, K. Jaspers published both the 3rd. Edition of his 
Allgemeine Psychopathologie (1913/1923), and Die Idee der Universität (1923), in which he tried to take 
a step away from the threat of both rationalism andscientifism. He would later reinstate the enlightened 
project of universal wisdom, but as of 1923, he presented no particular reflection on otherness, further 
than taking the patient as a singular individuality, and building an academic comnunity based on mutual 
respect. 
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the whole display of self and other is confined to the sphere of the community-as-world. 
But there is another type of discourse on alterity which we have called “absolute 
otherness,” or “transcendent otherness.” Here the problem is not about the “others” but 
about the “Other”. And the place of exchange is not within the community, but in the 
liminal space where this world gets connected with other worlds. The first type leads to 
social discourse, the second is clearly religious. The first type emphasizes interiority, 
the second exteriority. The first, subjectivity and time-perception, the second objectivity 
and the importance of place. In the Judeo-Christian tr dition about otherness we can 
discern a mixed type. For the “absolute Other” becomes a conversational partner, a 
“Thou”. In this sense it retains the dialogical struc ure of the first type, which is 
projected into the transcendent field of exteriority. We might say that exteriority and 
immanence coalesce into one single vision. In the second type, the perception of place 
and time, in any case, creates sacredness. We have seen that the visit of the marebito, 
which is occasional and unexpected in the beginning, tends to accommodate to festival 
time. The context of the religious festival moves our frame of mind beyond the 
requirements of dialogue and rationality. The exchange with otherness is then meta-
linguistic, in the sense that ritual poetry, in which the marebito is directly addressed, is 
not of the dialogical type, and the ritual formulas uttered by the marebito-performer in 
festivals are magical and not communicative.52  Now, magical language involves 
irrationality. 
  This is precisely what is remarked in another canonic work published in 1923. R. 
Otto’s Das Heilige (1923). Here we enter common ground. There are numerous 
references to characteristics of religious discourse that correspond to our analysis of the 
marebitoron. We must mention the notion of the “numinous” (das Numinose) or the 
mysterious, already borrowed in our previous analysis, and its several moments, starting 
from “Power” (Übermächtig), “Energy” (Energisch), and above all “the moment of 
mysterium (the “absolute Other”, das “Ganz Andere”). “Absolute otherness” awakens 
in us the primordial religious experience of entering a different dimension, the feeling of 
the “strange”, the “unusual”, the unfamiliar,53 in a word, “emotion” (stupor). The 
feeling of “absolute otherness” is attached to impressive objects that pertain to the 
natural, animal, or human order, objects “unfathomable” and “beyond conception,” 
which stand in opposition to our common sense due to their dissimilarity (dissimilitas) 
and accessibility only through mystic experience. We might then add the “fascinating” 
moment, and so we arrive at the full list of characterizations of the numinous which are 
equivalent with Origuchi’s description of the figure of the marebito.54 All the elements 
listed above are applicable to the marebito. Certainly, in marebito we discern the 
features of “uncommon power” (reii), “vital primary energy”, “otherness”, 
“strangeness”, “religious emotion”, “dissimilarity” (ikei) and “fascination”, and just as 
                                                
52 We might express this in John L. Austin’s terminology, saying that language in the marebito exchange 
with the community is of the “performative utterance” type, while its meaning in its use as a common 
“locutionary act”is subordinated to its character as“illocutionary act”. See Austin (1962) How to Do 
Things with Words, The Clarendon Press. 
53 See the following sentence: “Diese selber aber, nämlich das religiös Mysteriöse, das echte Mirum, ist, 
um es vielleicht am treffensten auszudrücken, das ‘G nz andere’, das thāteron, das anyad, das alienum, 
das aliud valde, das Fremde und Befremdende, das aus dem Bereiche des Gewohnten Verstandenen un 
Vertrauten  und darum ‘Heimlichen” überhaupt Herausf llende und zu ihm in Gegensatz sich Setzende 
und darum das Gemüt mit starrem Staunen Erfüllende” (OTTO 1923/1963, 31). 
54 Of course, there are other moments in Otto’s description of the numinous which are bracketed here, not 
just to evade the problem of dissonance between both discourses, but because methodologically we are 
focusing on defining a possible theoretical ground common to both authors regarding the perception of 
otherness. 
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in Otto’s analysis, the comprehensive word that encompasses all these features is 
“divine” (das Heilige = kami).55 
  In the section dedicated to the analysis of “total heterogeneity”, Otto displays his 
appreciation of the concepts of emptiness and nihilism in the Indian Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions. This places his analysis in a special position, a step further than the authors 
we have prevously reviewed. Already in 1923, Otto connects the problem of  the 
perception of heterogeneity with the inapprehensibility of the object, leading him to the 
consideration of emptiness and nihilism in Eastern raditions. This connection clearly 
precedes the argument displayed later by Heidegger, and more conspicuously noted by 
interested critics than the precursory task performed by Otto. 
  The notion of heterogeneity applied to Origuchi’s marebitoron presents two poles: 
heteromorphy and heterotopy. Heteromorphy refers to the way the presence of the 
marebito is acknowledged by the community, that is, as a strnge visitor (ikeijin), and 
heterotopy refers to the way the community imagines th  place of origin of the marebito, 
the tokoyo as exteriority. Thus far, in our comparative analysis we have been able to 
trace possible transcultural points of reference in relation to the otherness of the 
marebito, but the only reference to the contextual topology attached to this figure 
appears as transcendence, and depends on Judeo-Christian theology, or secondarily as 
the nothing, no-place attached to Buddhist philosophy. The tokoyo can be analyzed both 
as a place of transcendence, comparable to Takamagahara, and as a no-place, inasmuch 
as there is no imagery about its shape or topology, r even about its cosmological 
coordinates, that is, an u-topia. It is just another place. But in 1923 there already exists 
the possibility of looking at it from another theortical framework, that is perhaps more 
adequate. In this year, following a visit by Einstein to Japan, the journal Kaizō edited an 
article covering the theory of relativity. The article had a strong influence on intellectual 
circles and provoked a broad spreading of the notio of a multi-dimensional world and 
the relativity of time-space. Poets and artists started contributing their private imagery 
to the topic of other worlds and their connection t ours, among them, the utopist poet 
and writer Miyazawa Kenji. Miyazawa’s world view recalls some features we have 
discerned so far in our analysis of the marebito-as-other. Already, in his most 
expressive pieces of free verse, which appeared as Spring and Asura (Haru to Shura, 
vol. 1, 1923), Miyazawa gives way to his bizarre self-p rception and world-perception. 
Looking for a full integration of all dimensions ofexistence, he calls into a single line of 
thought a wide variety of heterogeneous elements which assemble themselves following 
his unique principle of arrangement. By so doing, he positions himself at a liminal point 
where different lines of space and time cross freely and intermingle. This he calls the 
“fourth-dimensional extension”.56 
 
                                                
55 We cannot overlookk the fact that there is a striking coincidence between many features characteristic 
of Kokugaku’s traditional emphasis on a theological hermeneutics of the irrational in kami discourse and 
Otto’s phenomenology of the divine. Comparative studies in Kokugaku circles of the 20th century have 
been discouraged nonetheless. An exception is the line of research followed by Nakano Yūzō’s 
comparative perspective in his study of Motoori Norinaga and the 19th century nativist Tachibana 
Moribe’s notions of kami. See 「橘守部の神理解」『神道宗教』第 184・185号、2002.   
56 He writes in the “Preface” to Spring and Asura: “All of these propositions/Are asserted within a fourth-
dimensional extension/As mental images and the nature of time iself”. (1923, English translation follows 
Kaneko in S. Glick, ed. 1987, The Comparative Reception of Relativity, Springer, 365-367). He also uses 
the expression “four dimensional structure” in the original manuscript, which he later discarded. For the 
discussion on whether Miyazawa is following an Einsteinian scheme or a Bergsonian appreciation of time
as durée, see the argument which follows the quotation offered above in ibid.  
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The introduction of a fourth extension has the consequence of opening up the world of 
common experience to the experience of alterity, which will be the base whereon 
Miyazawa will build up his richly imaginary cosmology. Fantasy and imagination are 
not opposed to reality and objectivity, but all are part of a multi-dimensional and 
integrated perception. Then life becomes art.57 In The Spring and Asura, Miyazawa 
places heterogeneity right in the centre. He presents himself as other than human, 
identifying with an Asura, a demonic entity in Buddhist cosmology who defends 
Buddhist law.58 In sum, Miyazawa’s poetic world also presents itself through the 
features of heterogeinity. The poet-as-Asura becomes a heterogeneous being from a 
heterogeneous place. The effect is transience, a poetic-shamanic experience, through 
which the unconscious mind operates in our world.59 In Miyazawa’s poetry, landscape 
is presented as a place of transformation, through the eye of heterogeneity. Doubtless, 
Miyazawa’s world and Origuchi’s intersect at one point, but they should not be 
confused. For one thing, whereas Origuchi rejects modernity and his linguistic 
commitment is very selective and reductive, Miyazawa incorporates the lexicon of 
modern science together with local expressions of tradition in a non-discriminative 
outlook, and by doing so situates himself beyond the dichotomy of ancient-modern, 
national-foreign. However, from the point of view of a philosophy of heterogeneity, in 
Miyazawa we find the most conspicuous example of an intellectual coetaneous to 
Origuchi, in which we also find the features of “heteromorphy” and “heterotopy”, 
although in a unique sense of these words.60 In relation to the “other”, the main 
difference is perhaps that while in Origuchi the “other” appears as a foreign presence 
towards the I-community, in Spring and Asura the “other” is “I”. 
  Finally, we must mention the publication in 1923 of two classic works in the field of 
cultural anthropology, namely, the English translation of L. Lévy-Bruhl’s La Mentalité 
primitive (Primitive Mentality, 1922), and J. G. Frazer’s abridged one-volume edition of 
The Golden Bough (1890/1923). For the purposes of our discussion we will focus on 
three ideas which L. Lévy-Bruhl presents in the forme  work. First, the importance the 
author gives to the unconscious way the primitive mind structures its world. Secondly, 
the belief in unseen powers found among primitive people. Third, the notion that the 
primitive worldview is not inferior to the civilised mind, but rather a totally different 
mode of thought. In Frazer’s reedition (1923), which became very popular, we find 
several references to Japan in connection with the main topics treated in the essay, but 
nothing which connects his pioneering research withthe question of otherness. He will 
                                                
57 Consider Miyazawa’s sentence: “Should we not make all of our fields and all of our life into one huge 
four-dimensional art?” (1926, in KATŌ 1979, 252). For comparative purposes, see K. Nishida’s notion of 
“absolute free will” (Art and Morality, Geijutsu to dōtoku, 1923), in relation to Miyazawa’s notion of 
freedom in artistic expression. 
58 The following poem is wellknown in this respect: 
 The bitterness and the lividness of rage 
 Spits to the depths of April’s atmospheric strata 
 Goes to and back, teeth gnashing 
 I … am … an … Asura. 
(KATŌ 1979, 252). 
59 This is what the poet G. Snyder calls the “savage” wisdom, which he saw in Miyazawa (The Back 
Country, 1967). 
60 It might be pointed out that there is a great difference between Miyazawa’s Buddhist monistic outlook  
and Origuchi’s traditionalistic Shinto outlook, but as a poet, Miyazawa’s Buddhism does not function in 
opposition to the kami world, for it is comprehensive. Miyazawa expresses “emotion” in front of “The 
Dancers of Haratai Village”, “strangely dressed beneath a crescent moon” (KATŌ1979, 252). At the 
same time, in Spring and Asura, heterotopy points to the liminal space where the pot situates himself 
between worlds, and not to a utopic distant world like the tokoyo. 
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nonetheless mention a few examples of possible interest from a comparative viewpoint: 
the author’s treatment of the subject of the external soul, in relation to the proto-
shamanic belief in the absence and return of the soul, might offer us a modified version 
of diverse techniques for propitiation of the soul, and shows a certain structural 
parallelism to the topic of the visit by the stranger and the invigorating result. Another 
aspect of interest lies in his argument that magic precedes religion. In this context, it 
would not be amiss to recall the confrontation between Origuchi’s stance in favor of 
shamanic practices in the Tohoku region, and the official religious-minded opposition to 
magic in powerful academic and political circles of the Shinto establishment. Of 
secondary interest in The Golden Bough is the treatment of the human incarnation of 
gods, and the fear of the stranger, which contrasts with the “fascination” towards the 
other we have found in Otto’s work.61  In sum, in the early twenties, cultural 
anthropology was inclined to study the problem of the primitive mind, “primitive 
culture”, “primitive language”, or even primitive psychology,62 and held a privileged 
position, eminently suited to the study of ancient beliefs of the marebito type. But in 
fact, the problem of the other would not be posed until much later, and we only find a 
precursory statement of the primitive mind as totally other in Lévy-Bruhl, who on the 
other hand does not touch upon the figure of otherness within ancient culture, but only 




  In the field of critical literature on marebito, E. Ohnuki-Tierney stands out for 
proposing a model for understanding marebito in the guise of a stranger as well as a 
foreigner, a viewpoint derived from the semiotics of the other, the other being a 
projection of the self to the outside, thus generating a given dynamics of re-
appropriation.63 In this sense, rather than seeing it as a feature of ancient Japanese 
beliefs, Ohnuki-Tierney sees marebito as an expression of a primordial psychological 
trait that underlies Japanese cultural history. Herinterpretation opens up the possibility 
of understanding marebito as the other, and creates a space for discussing marebito in 
the context of the dialectic self-other. It is of particular interest in that it permits us to 
take a step further from Origuchi’s marebitoron. By bringing forth the symbolic 
potentials contained in the figure of the marebito-as-other, Ohnuki-Tierney rescues its 
powerful appeal from the arcana of classical literature and remote mountain rituals, and 
uses it as an instrument to reassess the capacity of Japanese culture to relate as an island 
civilization to its exterior, which is to say the world. In an updated context of mutual 
exchange, that is, the necessity to appreciate the external power of reinvigorating the 
self, Ohnuki-Tierney has recently turned Origuchi’s marebitoron into a major 
contribution to the semiotics of culture that is perfectly in line with Western reflective 
traditions of the type of philosophies of the other analyzed in this essay. 
                                                
61 See on this respect chs. LXVI and LXVII of The Golden Bough. 
62 In the field of cultural psychology see examples in C. Bartlett, Psychology and Primitive Culture 
(1923); J. Piaget, Le Langage et la pensée chez l’enfant (1923); from the ethnographic field, Br 
Malinowski’s “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages” (1923); from the field of 
phenomenology, see vol. 1 of E. Cassirer Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923). 
63 Ohnuki-Tierney states: “I propose that from the pers ctive of reflexivity, the marebito, or stranger-
outsider deities who come from outside a settlement or outside of Japan, constitute the semiotic her for 
the Japanese, which is symbolically equivalent to their transcendental self, that is, the self perceived at a 
higher level of abstraction than a reflective self” (OHNUKI-TIERNEY 1993/1994, 54). 
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  Another modern scholar, Richard B. Pilgrim,64 has pointed out the importance of the 
spatial reference of the kekkai, or place where the marebito is received at New Year in 
the shrine or the home. The marebito is understood as “vague, formless energies or 
spirits (tama)” whose presence is somehow perceived (kehai) as visiting the human 
realm from “the other world” (tokoyo no kuni) or the mountains. As we have seen, in 
clear contrast to the shrine system of the post-Meiji Shinto establishment, in Origuchi’s 
symbolic topology the home has a privileged position. The polarity of the household 
receives its tension from the farthest possible place to it, the tokoyo. At the same time, 
the marebito belongs to a different nature from the Takamagahara p ntheon, marking its 
peripheral position, but at the same time its vital function for the social fabric to be able 
to survive, which reveals a conspicuously pre-structuralist outlook. Its numinous nature 
detachs it from the anthropomorphic or zoomorphic type of the kami in the Shinto 
pantheon. For the marebito can take a number of different guises, and its presence is felt 
even in some festivals, but remains unseen, confirming what we have already seen in 
Origuchi. This puts conceptual limits to an indiscrminate expansion of the theoretical 
potentials in marebito as a symbolic notion. In the context of the exchange between the 
self and the other, not any kind of exchange will result in a spiritual benefit for the self. 
The importance of place should be kept in mind, as well as the proper rhetoric of 
exchange. Ritual place and rhetoric can be reinterpreted to apply to the present. The 
home will always have a “sacred” meaning as the supportive and living spatial reference 
of the self. This topology generates a rhetoric whereby the self must act as “host” and 
the visitor coming from the exterior, defined by the limits of the home, must act as 
“guest”. The guest brings vital new energy to the home, so that the living space does not 
deteriorate into a closed shell. The home as an ope structure requires this kind of 
exchange. The stronger the tension between host and guest, that is the farther the 
distance from where the guest originates, the higher the spiritual capacity for renewal. 
In this way, the threshold, or the hearth, play a symbolically important role as liminal 
places for the encounter with “an other” who comes from another dimension. 
  The postmodern philosopher Nakazawa Shin’ichi (1950-) has published a 
monographic essay on the intellectual personality of Origuchi, (Kodai kara kita miraijin 
Orikuchi Shinobu, ‘O. Sh.: A Man of the Future Coming from the Past’ 2008). In an 
interview published earlier in France (2006), he acknowledged Origuchi to be an 
inspirational figure for his own philosophical endeavours. He also declared that 
although Origuchi has remained marginal because his thinking does not fit into any 
great system of thought, his way of thinking presented a unique and irreducible 
character. As a “philosopher ofdifference,” Origuchi is nothing less than vindicated by 
Nakazawa.65 
  In his book Nakazawa offers an original insight about the persistence of the symbolic 
role of the notion of marebito in the present, and stresses the mediation that the 
marebito performs between the other world and our world. ForNakazawa, marebito 
incarnates the exterior in our world, and  brings with him spiritual heterogeneity. His 
idea of the marebito represents a formal and conceptual way of expressing the need to 
host the incursion of the infinitely distant. It isnot just a literary metaphor, but a 
primary source for the possibility of “opening a pass ge to a heterogeneous world”. 
Concerning the tokoyo, Nakazawa points to Origuchi’s expression, “the home of the 
soul” (tamashii no furusato), as a nostalgia for a paradise lost and the desire to egain it. 
In this sense, the notion of marebito in Origuchi goes beyond academic query to 
                                                
64 In “Intervals (Ma) in Space and Time: Foundations for a Religio-Aesth tic Paradigm in Japan”, in FU 
1995, 55-80. 
65 See “Dialogue 3” in KASSILE 2006, 41. 
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become a vital matter. In a second sense, the tokoyo points to “the other world” (ano yo), 
whose passage to “this world” is made by the marebito. In this sense, the marebito are 
identified with the “spirits of the dead” (seirei), who appear in festivals held in many 
small islands of southern Japan, and who by wearing masks and covering themselves 
with vegetation, open a passage to the other world in people’s minds. The belief in 
marebito sustained in many different forms throughout the Japanese archipelago is 
evidence in favour of a kind of realism in Origuchi’s thinking that went beyond his 
poetical intuition. In sum, the notion of marebito is proof of Origuchi’s originality.66 
  We have seen that the notion of marebito can be taken in a variety of meanings, and 
that several interpretations are possible. From the conceptual viewpoint this might lead 
some critics to discard the term as not apt for a genuine philosophical discussion, but 
from the semiotic point of view, its partial ambiguity has the advantage of a symbolic 
richness that is absent in more abstract philosophical vocabulary. What I propose in this 
essay is to consider whether it is possible to translate this symbolic notion into a 
coherent philosophical discourse. Of course, this requires interpretation, that is, an 
application of the symbolic richness of the concept to a definite setting of argumentation. 
I have explored the possibility of interpreting marebito as a notion about “the other”, 
and I have checked all possible elements that can be found there regarding 
heterogeneity, like heteromorphy and heterotopy, and this in a global context. 
Discourses about the other are varied, and belong t different fields of knowledge. Our 
interpretation of marebito-as-other proves to be original within the context of the 
general conceptions of otherness. It is not possible to subsume it into any of the 
discourses on the other analyzed in this essay. In my opinion the marebito remains an 
outstanding contribution by Origuchi to a key problem in today’s philosophical debates. 
It cannot be reduced to a simple mechanism of projecti n of the self into its exterior: it 
is exteriority itself. It cannot be reduced to the interplay between self and other within 
the context of intersubjectivity. Nor is it reducible to the limits of theological discourse, 
for the marebito-as-kami does not fit well into any given pantheon. It has not been 
proved, I believe, that it can simply be identified with the cult of ancestors. It is a much 
more radical concept. Its utopian component, its radical heterogeneity, impels us to treat 
this notion in its own proper context, that is to say the liminality of space and the 
suggestion of a multidimensional conception of reality. Origuchi was not a philosopher: 
rather he passed on to posterity a half-poetic, half-intuitive notion associated with a 
suggestive word from antiquity. It is our task to draw out the potentiality of this notion 
and to transform it into a valid concept for today’s philosophical discourse. If my 
interpretation of the marebito-as-other is correct, then we may take a further stp and 
with a simple grammar of transitivity, postulate th notion of the other-as-marebito and 
explore the consequences. For instance, might we not transpose “total otherness” into 
the realm of intersubjectivity? This is what Origuchi seems to suggest. Marebito seems 
to have such a potencial. It requires an expectation, a protocol, a treatment, a celebration, 
all driven by the nostalgic desire for the “other”. It also involves an “ethics of 
hospitality” in a general framework of a theory of exchange.67 
                                                
66 See the chapter entitled 「「まれびと」の発見」in NAKAZAWA 2008a, 30-52. NAKAZAWA 
2008b, 166, situates the marebito type of kami within the broader framework of a theory of images, 
stressing the interface functionality of these kami, connecting the world of things seen with the realm of 
things unseen. 
67 It calls for consideration in the line of recent hermeneutical theories of “hospitality”, inspired byin 
Augustine, and following, s defined by Heidegger, Lévinas, Sartre, Ricoeur, and Derrida. See a general 
presentation in W. Ogletree (1985) Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions of Moral Understanding, 
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